Corporations--Cumulative Voting--Provision Therefor in By-Laws (Matter of American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 241 App. Div. 532 (2d Sept. 1934)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 9 
Number 1 Volume 9, December 1934, Number 1 Article 19 
June 2014 
Corporations--Cumulative Voting--Provision Therefor in By-Laws 
(Matter of American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 241 App. Div. 532 (2d 
Sept. 1934)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1934) "Corporations--Cumulative Voting--Provision Therefor in By-Laws (Matter of 
American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 241 App. Div. 532 (2d Sept. 1934))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 9 : No. 1 , 
Article 19. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss1/19 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
inquire into the degree of necessity for laws and enactments in the
matter would be to overstep the line of distinction between the legis-
lative and judicial departments of our government.'" In view of this
attitude of unwillingness to overstep this- line of demarcation, the
court did not look into the degree of necessity for the legislation
involved."
In the Legal Tender Cases,12 the court says that Congress has
the power to impair contracts by its legislation. "Every contract
for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily subject to the con-
stitutional power of the government over the currency, whatever that
power may be, and the obligation of the parties is, therefore, assumed
with reference to that power." 13 The prohibition on the payment
of obligations in gold even when the evidence of debt requires that
it be paid in gold or its equivalent and a direction' to cancel all such
obligations by payment of a dollar for each dollar of indebtedness is
within the power of Congress and is therefore a measure within the
powers conferred by the Constitution of the United States.1
4
J. A. R., JR.
CORPORATIONS-CUMULATIVE VOTING-PROVISION THEREFOR
IN BY-LAws.-Petitioner, a minority stockholder, seeks confirmance
of election of a director through cumulative voting of his stock
pursuant to a by-law adopted by the corporation with consent of all
the stockholders authorizing that method of voting. Respondents,
majority stockholders, claim that since there is no provision in the
certificate of incorporation providing for cumulative voting, the elec-
tion is invalid. Held, such provision in by-laws creates a vested right
in the stockholder, and is binding on the other stockholders. Matter
of exigency arises, and not a judicial question to be afterwards passed upon
by the courts." Legal Tender Cases, supra note 3, at 450.
10 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra note 5.
' Legal Tender Cases, supra note 3.
1Ibid.
"Id. at 457.
" Instant case; Rae v. Homestead Loan & Guarantee Co., 176 U. S. 121,
20 Sup. Ct. 341 (1899) ; United States v. Boak Fish Co., 146 Fed. 104 (Cir. Ct.
3rd D. Minn. 1906); Ceballos v. United States, 146 Fed. 380 (C. C. A. 2d,
1906) ; Troy v. Bland, 58 Ala. 197 (1877) ; Belloc v. Davis, 38 Cal. 242 (1869) ;
Jones v. Harker, 37 Ga. 502 (1867) ; Black v. Lusk, 69 Ill. 70 (1873) ; Brown
v. Welch, 26 Ind. 116 (1866); Hintrager v. Bates, 23 Iowa 331 (1867);
George v. Concord, 45 N. H. 434 (1864); Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck,
27 N. Y. 400, writ of error dismissed, 68 U. S. 512 (1863) ; Schollenberger v.
Brinton, 52 Pa. St. 9 (1866); Johnson v. Ivey, 44 Tenn. 608 (1867). In re
Societ6 Intercommunale Belge d'Electricit6-Feist v. The Company, 49 Times
Law Reports 344. Contra: Hepburn v. Griswold, supra note 3; Meyer v.
Kaufmann, 37 Ga. 600 (1868); Hepburn v. Griswold, 63 Ky. 20 (1865);
Meyer v. Roosevelt, 25 How. Pr. 97 (N. Y. 1862).
RECENT DECISIONS
of American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 241 App. Div. 532, 272 N. Y.
Supp. 206 (2d Dept. 1934).
At the cohimon law each stockholder, regardless of the number
of shares held, was entitled to one vote only.' In New York, under
the present statute,2 each stockholder is entitled to one vote for each
share of stock held.8 Cumulative voting is one way of exercising
that right.4
The New York statute 5 states that a provision for cumulative
voting "may" appear in the certificate of incorporation or other
certificate filed according to law.6 "May" in a statute will usually be
construed as merely permissive.7 Does this mean, however, that
although there may be such a provision, it must appear in the certifi-
cate of incorporation or other duly filed certificate? Legislative
intent is the key to interpretation.8 Under the court's holding in the
instant case, the words "certificate of incorporation" are insignificant.
Vain use of language by the legislature will not be presumed. 9 But
looking beyond the wording to the result sought by the legislature, 10
it has been said that cumulative voting is intended to give minority
stockholders some representation on the board of directors." In
some states 12 this intent has been carried out by a right granted by
law, con stitutional or statutory, which cannot be taken away by reso-
lution or by-law.'3 In this state, the statute 14 is merely permissive,' 5
suggesting one method of protecting the stockholder.16 Equally
'3 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed.) §609.
'N. Y. STOCK Copp. LAW (1923) §47.
3Ibid.
' Instant case.
'N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW (1923) §49.
0 Ibid.
Medbury v. Swan, 46 N. Y. 200, 201 (1871) ; People ex rel. Comstock v.
Mayor, 59 Hun 258, 12 N. Y. Supp. 890 (N. Y. 1891), aff'd, 128 N. Y. 632,
29 N. E. 146 (1891).
8 Caddy v. Interboro Rapid Transit Co., 195 N. Y. 415, 88 N. E. 747
(1909); Wiley v. Solvay Process Co., 215 N. Y. 584, 588, 109 N. E. 606, 608
(1915); New York Railways Co. v. City of New York, 218 N. Y. 483, 113
N. E. 501 (1916); State Industrial Commissioner v. Newman, 222 N. Y. 363,
118 N. E. 794 (1918).
' Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louis Padula Co., Inc., 224 N. Y. 397, 121 N. E.
348 (1918) ; Johanns v. Ficke, 224 N. Y. 513, 519,-121 N. E. 358, 360 (1918).
" 103 Park Ave. Corp. v. Exchange Buffet Corp., 242 N. Y. 366, 152 N. E.
117 (1926) ; see also Emerson v. Buck, 230 N. Y. 380, 130 N. E. 584 (1921).
"Matter of Jamaica Consumers Ice Co., 190 App. Div. 739, 741, 180 N. Y.
Supp. 384, 386 (lst Dept. 1920), aff'd, 229 N. Y. 516, 129 N. E. 897 (1920).
'2Tomlin v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 52 Mo. App. 430 (1893); Pierce
v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. 150 (1883) ; Cross v. West Va. Cent. & P. Ry. Co.,
35 W. Va. 174, 12 S. E. 1071 (1891).
" Tomlin v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, supra note 12, at 436.
"Supra note 5.
" Instant case.
20 Ibid.
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binding as the charter 17 are the by-laws of the corporation 18 which
vest a right that cannot be taken away without the owner's consent.19
Cumulative voting provided for therein carries out to a large extent
the intent of the legislature and an election by votes cast cumulatively
under such a provision should be affirmed.
J. T. B., JR.
CRIMES-MURDER IN FIRST DEGREE-COMMON LAW RULE
THAT DEATH MUST OCCUR WITHIN A YEAR AND A DAY ABROGATED
BY STATUTE.-The defendant was convicted of murder in the first
degree. The deceased was shot on July 22, 1928, and died on July
13, 1932. The defendant claims that the indictment should have
been quashed as to murder in the first degree. Held, common law
rule that the death must occur within a year and a day has been
abrogated by statute. People v. Brengard, 265 N. Y. 100, 191 N. E.
842 (1934).
At common law to have a conviction for murder in the first
degree, the deceased must die within a year and a day of the day
on which the assault was committed.1 If the victim does not so die
then the common law conclusively presumes that the death was due
to some other cause.2 This rule remains unchanged in many juris-
dictions.3  Under the first constitution adopted in New York, the
'Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159, 179 (1879); Hassel v.
Pohle, 214 App. Div. 654, 658, 212 N. Y. Supp. 561, 566 (2d Dept. 1925);
Brick Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N. Y. 1826).
" Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 223 N. Y. 103, 107, 119 N. E.
237, 238 (1918); Matter of Corp. of Yaddo, 216 App. Div. 1, 3, 214 N. Y.
Supp. 523, 525 (3d Dept. 1926).
1 Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., Hassel v. Pohle, both supra note 17;
Matter of Corp. of Yaddo, supra note 18.
11 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (10th ed. 1896) 336; 2 COOLEY, BLACKSTONE
(4th ed. 1899) 1363; "The time both of the stroke and the death should be
stated (in the indictment) that the death may appear to have taken place
within a year and a day after the mortal injury"; 1 BARBOUR, CRIMINAL LAW
(3d ed. 1883) 71; Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120 (1854); People v. Enoch, 13
Wend. 159 (N. Y. 1834); Thomas v. State, 67 Ga. 460 (1881); Clark v.
Commonwealth, 90 Va. 360, 18 S. E. 440 (1893) ; 29 C. J. 1083.
2 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (10th ed. 1896) 336; 1 BARBOUR, CRIMINAL
LAW (3d ed. 1883) 71; Burns & Cary v. People, 1 Park. Cr. 182 (N. Y.
1848) ; People v. Aro, 6 Cal. 207 (1856) ; People v. Kelley, 6 Cal. 210 (1856);
State v. Mayfield, 66 Mo. 125 (1877) ; State v. Orrell, 12 N. C. 139 (1828).
'Ball v. United States, 140 U. S. 118, 11 Sup. Ct 761 (1891) ; Howard v.
State, 7 Div. 787, 137 So. 532 (Ala. 1931); Roberts v. State, 17 Ariz.
159, 149 Pac. 380 (1915); Kee v. State, 28 Ark. 155 (1872); People v. Aro,
supra note 2; People v. Kelley, supra note 2; State v. Bantley, 44 Conn. 537
(1877) ; Jane v. Commonwealth, 3 Metc. 18 (Ky. 1860) ; State v. Kennedy, 8
Rob. 590 (La. 1845); State v. Conley, 39 Me. 78 (1854); Commonwealth v.
Macloom, 101 Mass. 1 (1869) ; Harrel v. State, 39 Miss. 702 (1861) ; State v.
